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PRODUCTS LIABILITY-RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS-ViRGIN IS-
LANDS COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATUTE APPLIED IN STRICT PROD-
UCTS LIABILITY ACTION
Murray v. Fairbanks Morse (1979)
Norwilton Murray was injured while he was installing an electrical con-
trol panel which had been manufactured by Beloit Power Systems (Beloit).'
Murray brought a products liability action against Beloit, alleging alternative
theories of strict liability and negligence. 2 Beloit defended on the grounds
that the plaintiff's method of installation was highly dangerous 3 and that he
had assumed the risk posed by this method of installation. 4 A jury verdict
was returned in favor of the plaintiff, but, upon a finding that the plaintiff
was at fault to the extent of five percent, the verdict was reduced by that
amount. 5 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit 6 affirmed, holding that the Virgin Islands' statutory comparative fault
1. Murray v. Beloit Power Sys. Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1145, 1146 (D.V.I. 1978), aff'd sub
nom. Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979). The plaintiff, an experienced
instrument fitter, was assigned the task of aligning the base of the control panel with a platform
and securing the unit with mounting bolts. 610 F.2d at 150. The platform was over an open
space approximately 10 feet above a concrete floor. Id. In order to protect the delicate in-
strnmentation inside the panel during shipping, Beloit had attached two iron cross bars to the
open bottom of the unit. Id. The plaintiff fell when a protective cross bar gave way as he was
attempting to align the unit. Id. at 151. It was determined at trial that the cross bar collapsed
because it had been only temporarily "tack-welded" to the unit, as opposed to a more perma-
nent "butt-weld." Id.
2. 450 F. Supp. at 1146. The basis of the plaintiff's complaint was that the support had
been improperly welded, thus giving rise to a cause of action tinder both strict products liability
and negligence principles. 610 F.2d at 151.
3. 450 F. Supp. at 1146. The Plaintiff had placed his weight on one of the cross bars while
leaning over the open space at the bottom of the unit. 610 F.2d at 151. Beloit presented expert
evidence that the plaintiff's technique was highly dangerous and, therefore, negligent. Id.
4. 450 F. Supp. at 1147. Beloit's expert testified that Murray could have avoided the acci-
dent by employing widely used methods for safely installing similar units, such as erecting a
movable scaffold or cover below him to break his fall. 610 F.2d at 163. In reply, Murray intro-
duced testimony from his supervisor showing that Murray had installed approximately 400 units
over an 18-year period without incident while following the same procedures he had used on
the day of his accident. Id.
5. 610 F.2d at 150. The jury, in response to special interrogatories, found that the plain-
tiff's method of installation was a proximate cause of his injuries and that he contributed to his
own injuries to the extent of five percent. Id. The judgment was reduced acordingly. Id. On
appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial court had erred in acccepting contributory negli-
gence as a defense to a products liability action grounded upon section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, and that the trial court should not have reduced his recovery in proportion to
his own contributory negligence. Id.
6. Judge Rosenn wrote for a panel which included Judges Maris and Hunter.
(1072)
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principles 7 were applicable to strict products liability actions 8 brought under
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement). Murray v.
Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979).
The states that have adopted comparative negligence statutes 9 are di-
vided as to whether such statutes may be applied in section 402A products
7. The Virgin Islands had recently enacted a comparative negligence statute of the "mod-
ified" variety, which reduces a plaintiff's recovery in proportion to his fault, but bars recovery if
it is determined that the plaintiff's fault was greater than the defendant's. V.I. CODE ANN. tit.
5, § 1451 (Equity Cum. Supp. 1978). The statute states in pertinent part:
(a) In any action based upon negligence to recover for injury to person or property,
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall
be diminished by the trier of fact in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable
to the plaintiff. The burden of proving contributory negligence shall be on the defendant.
If such claimant is found by the trier of fact to be more at fault than the defendant, or, in
the case of multiple defendants, more at fault than the combined fault of the defendants,
the claimant may not recover.
(b) This section does not apply to any action based upon a statute the violation of
which imposes absolute liability, whether or not such statute comprehends negligent con-
duct.
Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the distinction between the various forms of compara-
tive negligence statutes, see note 9 infra.
8. 610 F.2d at 164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A
provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
Id. By virtue of a statute enacted in 1967, the Restatement is authoritative in the Virgin Islands,
absent local law to the contrary. See V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 4 (Equity Cum. Supp. 1978).
The drafters of the Restatement, however, have provided for two defenses which prevent
actions under section 402A from being tantamount to absolute liability. The Restatement pro-
vides that assumption of the risk will bar recovery, "[i]f the user or consumer discovers the
defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the
product and is injured by it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n.
Moreover, product misuse unforeseeable to the defendant is a defense, "[i]f the injury
results from abnormal Iandling . . . abnormal preparation for use . . . or from abnormal con-
sumption." Id., Comment h. See Dale & Hilton, Use of the Product-When is it Abnormal?, 4
WILLAMETTE L. J. 350, 352 (1967); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory
Negligence and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 119-28 (1972). Courts have differed
on whether these defenses are themselves subject to the application of comparative fault princi-
ples. Compare Keegan v. Anchor Inns, Inc., 606 F.2d 35, 39 (3d Cir. 1979) with General
Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tex. 1977). See note 62 infra.
Neither the assumption of the risk defense nor the product misuse defense was applicable
under the facts of Murray. See 610 F.2d at 162.
9. Since the advent of comparative negligence, three distinct forms of such statutes have
evolved. See generally Shrager & Shepherd, History, Development and Analysis of the Pennsyl-
vania Comparative Negligence Act: An Overview, 24 VILL. L. REV. 422, 435 n.92 (1979) (part of
a symposium on comparative negligence in Pennsylvania). A minority of the jurisdictions that
have adopted comparative negligence statutes have chosen the so-called "pure" form of com-
parative negligence, whereby a plaintiff's recovery is reduced directly in proportion to his own
fault, regardless of the relative extent of the plaintiff's fault as compared to that of the defen-
1979-1980] 1073
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liability cases. 10 This division of authority is a reflection of the conflict be-
tween the strict liability policy underlying section 402A 11 and the traditional
negligence notion that manufacturers should not be forced to pay for losses
attributable to a plaintiff's conduct rather than to any product defect. 12
Several courts have applied comparative fault principles in strict prod-
ucts liability actions in an effort to achieve an equitable distribution of
losses. 13  Frequently citing considerations of "fairness," 14 and often noting that
dant. See id., citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 1411-1413
(McKinney 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-20-4 to -4.1 (Snpp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 9
4.22.010-.910 (Supp. 1977).
Most of the states which have enacted comparative negligence laws have adopted what has
been called its "modified" form. Shrager & Shepherd, supra, at 435 n.92. Under the "modified"
form, a plaintiff's recovery is reduced in proportion to his fault tip to a statutorily prescribed
cutoff, generally 50%, beyond which such fault operates as a total bar to recovery. See id.,
citing ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973
& Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Stipp. 1978); HAWAII R9v. STAT. §
663-31 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801 to -806 (Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-258a
to -258b (1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 156 (Stipp. 1978-1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
231 § 85 (West Sopp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1979); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 58-607.1 (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 507:7-a (Stipp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (West Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (West Supp. 1978-1979); OR. REV.
STAT. § 18.470-.490 (1979); TEX. REV. Civ, STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 to -43 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1978-1979); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (1977).
A relatively small number of jurisdictions have adopted a third approach, applying com-
parative negligence principles only where the plaintiff's negligence may be characterized as
"'slight" and the defendant's as "gross." See Shrager & Shepherd, supra, at 435 n.92, citing
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (Supp. 1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967).
10. See notes 13-22 and accompanying text infra.
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment c (1965). Essentially, the
drafters of the Restatement determined that the burden of accidental injuries caused by prod-
ucts intended for use by consumers should be borne by the manufacturer and be treated as a
cost of production against which protection can be obtained by the purchase of liability insur-
ance. Id. Traditionally, this has been referred to as a "deep pockets" approach. See Murray v.
Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d at 161. Such an approach "has the desirable effect of deterring
manufacturers and sellers from introducing unsafe products into the stream of commerce." Id.
at 158.
12. The rationale for this argument is based upon the theory that, by forcing manufacturers
to pay judgments without reduciig them by the proportion attributable to the plaintiff's fault,
the future cost of the product to the public will be artifically inflated and unrepresentative of
the actual risk posed by the defective product. See 610 F.2d at 161. Although individual plain-
tiffs may benefit from not having their recoveries reduced by the amount of their negligence,
consumers in general may be adversely affected by the artifically high costs. See id.; Owen,
Rethinking the Policies of Strict Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681, 703-07 (1980) (criticizing the
policy of "spreading the loss" to compensate persons injured by defective products).
13. See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska
1976) (comparative negligence statute applied to reduce plaintiff's recovery in strict liability suit
where plaintiff's racing of snow machine and/or lack of maintenance contributed to his injuries);
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978)
(application of comparative negligence to strict products liability is consistent with policy leading
to adoption of comparative negligence statutes); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80
(Fla. 1976) (consumer, user, or bystander required to exercise ordinary due care, therefore
contributory or comparative negligence is a valid defense in a strict liability action if the defense
is based upon grounds other than the failure of the user to discover the defect or to guard
against the possibility of its existence).
14. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978). The Daly court noted that it was "persuaded by logic, justice, and fundamental fairness"
1074
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manufacturers would still be liable for any harm attributable to a defective
product, 15 these courts have been unwilling to immunize products liability
plaintiffs against their own negligence. 16  A contrary view is taken by courts
which reason that the focus of section 402A is on the product and the con-
sumer's reasonable expectations with regard to that product, rather than on
the conduct of the manufacturer or the injured user. 1 7  These courts feel
that it is improper to inject negligence concepts into strict products liability
analysis, an approach which rests on entirely different policy considera-
tions. 18
Other jurisdictions treat the issue as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion.1 9  Some courts have interpreted comparative negligence statutes liter-
ally, thereby limiting their scope, in accordance with the usual statutory
language which confines their applicability to "actions based on negli-
gence." 20 Others have applied such statutes in the strict products liability
context, reasoning either that a section 402A action is akin to "negligence
per se" and therefore within the scope of the statute, 21 or that the absence
of legislative direction affords courts the leeway for an interpretation that
comparative principles should apply. 22
in concluding that a system of comparative fault should be extended to strict products liability
actions. Id. at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
15. See Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976). The
Butaud court noted that "[t]he defendant is strictly liable for the harm caused from his defective
product, except that the award of damages shall be reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's
contribution to his injury." Id. at 46.
16. See note 13 and accompanying text supra. It should be noted that, as this note went to
print, two courts had already cited Murray in applying comparative negligence principles in
products liability actions. See Gediman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Stpp. 1244 (D. Mass.
1980); Kennedy v. Sawyer, 4 Kan. App. 2d 545, 608 P.2d 1379 (1980).
17. See, e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (application of Ne-
braska "slight-gross" comparative negligence statute would be extremely confusing and inappro-
priate in a strict products liability case because proof of negligence or degree of fault is not
required); Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976) (comparative negligence
has no application to products liability actions under § 402A).
18. See Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 557, 553 P.2d 835, 837 (1976). For a
discussion of the policy behind the enactment of § 402A, see note 11 supra.
19. For a discussion of this approach, see notes 20-22 and accompanying text infra.
20. See, e.g., Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978) (New
Hampshire comparative negligence statute not applicable because it is confined by its terms to
actions for negligence); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974) (Ok-
lahoma comparative negligence statute not applicable because specifically limited to negligence
actions). For an example of the usual statutory language, as used in the Virgin Islands statute,
see note 7 supra.
21. See, e.g., Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D.
Idaho 1976) (predicting that the Idaho Supreme Court would apply comparative cansation in a
strict products liability case since strict liability, like negligence per se, is capable of causal
comparison); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) (liability imposed under
doctrine of strict liability is not grounded on failure to exercise ordinary care but is more akin to
negligence per se and, hence, such "negligence" is comparable to that of plaintiff).
22. See Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740 (D. Kan. 1978) (court
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It was against this background that the Third Circuit in Murray faced
the issue of whether to extend the Virgin Islands' comparative negligence
statute to section 402A actions. 23  Noting that the legislature had expressed
no opinion on the matter 24 and that the statute does not expressly prohibit
its applicability in strict liability suits, 25 the court concluded that passage of
the statute had not been designed to preclude a comparison of fault in ac-
tions brought under the strict liability theory. 26 Based upon this assump-
tion, the Third Circuit deemed it permissible to apply "helpful and fair"
comparative principles as part of the common law in the products liability
area. 27
The Murray court then turned its attention to the task of determining
how comparative principles should operate in strict products liability
cases. 28 To the extent that it foreclosed any actual comparison of degrees of
fault, the court rejected the literal "comparative fault" approach. 29 The
court stated that the proper conceptual basis for comparison of the product
defect and the plaintiff's misconduct is an examination of the "causative con-
tribution of each to the particular loss or injury." 30 Under this approach,
following a determination that both the plaintiff and the defendant were in-
deed at "fault," the inquiry focuses upon the relative extent to which the
product defect and the plaintiff's conduct "caused-in-fact" all or part of the
injury. 32 The court found this approach to be consistent with the policy
23. 610 F.2d at 156-57.
24. Id. at 157. It is apparent that the court was following the approach of those courts which
deem themselves fit to fill the voids perceived to have been left the legislature. Id. at 156.
See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
25. 610 F.2d at 157. The court noted that the comparative negligence statute is made ex-
pressly inapplicable only to statutorily based absolute liability actions. Id. See V.I. CODE ANN.
tit. 5, § 1451(b) (Equity Cum. Supp. 1978); note 7 supra. The court reasoned, however, that
strict products liability actions under the Restatement involve neither statutorily based liability
nor absolute liability. 610 F.2d at 157. But see note 8 supra. The Third Circuit explicitly re-
jected the plaintiff's contention that the court's authority was restricted by the fact that the
Virgin Islands has adopted the Restatement as authoritative. 610 F.2d at 157 n.1l.
26. 610 F.2d at 157.
27. Id., citing Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 751 (D. Kan.
1978). See Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171,
179-80 (1974). For a discussion of the propriety of this decision by the court, see notes 43-45
and accompanying text infra.
28. 610 F.2d at 157-58.
29. Id. at 158-61. Judge Rosenn indicated that a comparison of fault was inappropriate in a
strict liability case because the focus in such a suit is on the product, rather than the conduct, of
the manufacturer. Id. at 158-60. Citing the underlying policy considerations and conceptual
distinctions between strict liability and negligence, Judge Rosenn concluded that a comparison
of fault provides neither a conceptual nor a pragmatic basis for apportioning a loss. Id. at 159.
30. Id. at 159.
31. Id. Judge Rosenn clarified the court's position by stating that, "[o]nly when [plaintiff's]
conduct fails to meet a societal standard of reasonable care should the causal link between
conduct and injury be examined." Id. at 159 n.12.
32. Id. at 160. Once the jury has determined that the product defect caused the injury, the
defendant is strictly liable for the harm attributable to the defective product. Id. The jury is
then required to reduce damages "in proportion to the plaintiff's contribution to his own loss or
1076
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goal of strict products liability 33 -i.e., relieving plaintiffs from the complex
burdens of proof attendant to theories of negligence and warranty. 34  Al-
though noting that its "causative contribution" approach was inconsistent
with the policy goal of placing the burden of loss on the "deep pockets" of
manufacturers who are best suited to insure against such loss, the court went
on to criticize that policy. 3 5 Judge Rosenn argued that, by forcing the man-
ufacturer to pay for a portion of the loss attributable, not to a product defect,
but to consumer conduct, the price of the product becomes artificially in-
flated, does not accurately reflect the risk posed, and encourages consumers
to purchase cheaper, less safe products. 36
It is submitted that the court in Murray was primarily concerned with
reaching a result conforming with its perception of an equitable means of
ascertaining ultimate tort liability 3 7 and, hence, failed to give proper atten-
tion in its analysis to the legitimate methods of statutory interpretation, judi-
cial restraint, and the advancement of public policy. 38 It is further submit-
ted that the court struggled to construct an interpretation of the Virgin
Islands' statute-which on its face directs that it be applied to actions "based
upon negligence" 39 -that would permit it to apply comparative fault princi-
ples in a strict products liability context. The court attempted to justify such
an interpretation by citing the absence of contrary legislative direction. 40
Notwithstanding this rationalization, it is suggested that the court effectively
overstepped, and even ignored, the well-established goal4' of comparative
injury." Id., quoting Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction & Design Co., 565 F.2d
1129, 1139 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying comparative fault concepts to a strict liability case brought
in admiralty).
33. 610 F.2d at 161. For a discussion of this policy, see notes 11 & 29 supra.
34. 610 F.2d at 161. The goal of easing the plaintiff's burden of proof was not impaired, the
court suggested, because he still need only prove the existence of a defect causally linked to the
injury. Id. The burden lay with the defendant to prove the plaintiff's contributory fault. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. For a critical discussion of this argument, see notes 55-56 and accompanying text
infra.
37. 610 F.2d at 158. The court stated that "the use of comparative principles in section
402A actions can achieve a more equitable allocation of the loss from product related injuries."
id.
38. See notes 40-56 and accompanying text infra.
39. For the text of the statute, see note 7 supra.
40. 610 F.2d at 157. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
41. Justice Frankfurter has noted that statutory construction is based upon a search for the
purpose of the words. See Frankfurter, Some Reflection on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 527, 538-44 (1947). As Justice Frankfurter observed: "Legislation has an aim; it seeks to
obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan
of government." Id. at 538-39. The purpose and aim of a comparative negligence statute is to
avoid the harsh result of the contributory negligence defense which may be a complete bar to
recovery. See note 43 and accompanying text infra. In considering the applicability of the sta-
tute to a strict products liability case in which contributory negligence is of no concern, it is
submitted that the court has moved beyond an examination of the statute's purpose. Words, at
least initially, must be assumed to be in accord with their common meaning. Frankfurter,
supra, at 536. Statutory construction is "[niot ... an opportunity for a judge to use words as
'empty vessels into which he can pour anything he will'-his caprices, fixed notions, even states-
manlike beliefs in a particular policy." Id. at 529. It is therefore submitted that judge Rosenn
1979-19801 1077
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negligence legislation.4 2 In light of the legislative purpose of mitigating the
harshness of contributory negligence defenses 43 and in light of the Restate-
ment's recognition that contributory negligence is not a defense in a strict
products liability action, 44 it is submitted that the court's attempt to apply
"helpful and fair" common law principles to expand the express scope of the
pertinent statute was tantamount to usurpation of the legislature's func-
tion. 4 5
should have adhered to the plain meaning of the statute's directive that it apply to actions
"based on negligence," rather than incorporating his own notions of equitable distribution of
loss into language not addressed to the strict products liability suit.
42. For a discussion of the purpose and aim of comparative negligence legislation, see note
43 and accompanying text infra.
43. The court recognized the wide acceptance and approval of the comparative concept,
noting that it had been "adopted by the majority of American jurisdictions in ordinary negli-
gence actions to replace the harsh rule of contributory negligence which absolutely bars a plain-
tiff from recovery, even if his negligence is slight when compared with the defendant's." 610
F.2d at L55-56. For a discussion of the history and development of the doctrines of contributory
and comparative negligence, see Shrager & Shepherd, supra note 9, at 423-36.
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965). While recognizing
assumption of the risk as a valid defense, Comment n explicitly states that contributory negli-
gence is not a defense in a strict liability action "when such negligence consists merely in a
failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence,"
reasoning that § 402A actions are concerned with strict liability, not with the negligence of the
parties. Id.
45. The court exhibited a misplaced reliance on the case of Stueve v. American Honda
Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740 (1). Kan. 1978). See notes 22 & 27 and accompanying text supra.
In Stieve, the district court felt free to apply the Kansas comparative negligence statute to a
strict products liability case, in large part because the statute was enacted prior to the state
supreme court's endorsement of § 402A. 457 F. Supp. at 751. The Stueve court noted the
significance of this fact by pointing out that, "typically, a state's adoption of strict liability (and
consequent ruling that mere contributory negligence is no defense thereto) predates the adop-
tion of comparative negligence." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the Stueve court did not feel
bound by a legislative determination which was not constrained by a prior judicial determina-
tion that contributory negligence was no defense. Id. at 751-52. It was therefore possible to
derive a legislative interpretation which did not conflict with an obvious legislative purpose of
mitigating the harshness of the contributory negligence defense. Id.
It is submitted that a similar determination is not proper with respect to the Virgin Islands
statute, since adoption of § 402A in that jurisdiction predated the adoption of comparative neg-
ligence and since the legislature was therefore unconcerned with its effect on strict liability,
having already banned contributory negligence as a defense. See V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 4
(Equity Cumm. Suipp. 1978). Passed in 1967, § 4 provides that Restatement law is authoritative in
the Virgin Islands in the absence of local law to the contrary, Id. See notes 8 & 9 supra. In light
of this analysis, it is suggested that the Third Circuit would do well to consider the words of the
late Justice Harlan regarding the respective roles of the legislature and the judiciary:
Today's decision, it seems to me, reflects to an unusual degree the current notion that
this Court possesses a peculiar wisdom all its own whose capacity to lead this Nation out
of its present troubles is contained only by the limits of judicial ingenuity . . . . For
anyone who, like myself, believes that it is an essential finction of this Court to maintain
the constitutional divisions . . . among the three branches of the Federal Government,
today's decision is a step in the wrong direction.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 677 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). It is submitted that the
Third Circuit in Murray has assumed the role of a "siper-legislature," and, thus, struggled to
create statutory ambiguities which provided it with a pretense for enunciating its own views on
a particular topic about which the legislature has spoken recently and clearly.
1078
7
Lange: Products Liability - Restatement (Second) of Torts - Virgin Islan
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
In attempting to distinguish "causative contribution" from "comparative
fault" as a valid means of determining how comparative principles should
operate,4 6 it is submitted that the court has created a distinction which exists
only as a matter of semantics. The court's rationale for rejecting "compara-
tive fault" in favor of "causative contribution" was that strict products liabil-
ity focuses on the product rather than on the conduct of the parties.4 7
Under the "causative contribution" analysis, however, following a finding of
product defect, the court inquires into the "'fault" of the plaintiff as a causa-
tive comparison is to be made "[o]nly when [plaintiff's] conduct fails to meet
a societal standard of reasonable care." 4  Clearly this inquiry is not focused
on the product. Furthermore, the ensuing causation inquiry proposed by the
court focuses squarely on the conduct of the parties, comparing the role of
both the product defect and the plaintiff's conduct in causing the injury.4 9
The court's "causative contribution" analysis is thus thoroughly reminiscent
of the very negligence principles that section 402A was designed to eliminate
in a strict products liability case. 50
Although the court deemed its holding to be consistent with the policy
goals of strict products liability, 5 1 it is submitted that, under the court's
"comparative causation" analysis, the plaintiff's burden is not limited to
proof of the "existence of a defect causally linked to the injury." 52 While it
is true that, under the court's approach, the defendant would bear the bur-
den of proving the plaintiff's contributory fault, 53 as a practical matter it
would be incumbent upon the plaintiff to produce evidence to rebut the
inference of his own negligence, thereby defeating one of the purposes of
strict liability. 5  Furthermore, the court's desire to relieve the manufac-
turer from the portion of a loss attributable to the plaintiff's fault 55 is incon-
sistent with the "deep pockets" policy of section 402A, under which the
manufacturer is to bear the burden of the loss, insure against it, and spread
the cost among all consumers through the price of the product.56
46. See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
47. 610 F.2d at 158-60. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
48. 610 F.2d at 159 n.12 (emphasis added). See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
49. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text stupra.
50. It is submitted that the court's requirement of a violation of some standard of care in its
determination of fault, coupled with its examination of causation and loss (damages), is equiva-
lent to a requirement of a prima facie case of negligence, a concept that has no place in a strict
liability action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965). See also
notes 43-44 and accompaying text supra.
51. 610 F.2d at 161. See nQtes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
52. See 610 F.2d at 161.
53. id.
54. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
55. See 610 F.2d at 161.
56. See notes 11-12 & 35 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that Judge Rosenn's
argument that the cost of insuring against injury due to consumer conduct and not product
defect artifically inflates prices and encourages purchase of less safe products is purely specula-
tive and lacks empirical support. See 610 F.2d at 161. Judge Rosenn presented no data indica-
tive of a rise in cost to the consumer resulting from higher manufacturers' insurance premiums
10791979-1980]
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It is submitted that the Third Circuit's decision to apply comparative
principles in strict products liability cases will have the practical effect of
reducing, and even eliminating, plaintiff's verdicts in jurisdictions following
this approach. 57 Section 402A plaintiffs will have their verdicts reduced by
up to fifty percent in cases where their "causative contribution" is not
deemed to be more causative of the injury than the defective product.58 In
cases where the plaintiff's "causative contribution" is greater than fifty per-
cent, the "harsh rule" of contributory negligence is effectively revived, to-
tally barring recovery. 59
Additionally, the implicit reinstitution of the contributory negligence de-
fense, under the guise of the comparative negligence statute, in strict pro-
ducts liability cases raises questions as to the continued viability of assump-
tion of the risk and product misuse as absolute defenses in section 402A
actions.6 0 In order to be consistent with its desire to secure "a proper allo-
cation of the loss in strict products liability cases,"61 the Third Circuit, it is
submitted, must stand ready to apply comparative principles in cases where
these defenses are properly asserted. 6 2 Thus, while Murray may be per-
and any corresponding decrease in quantity demanded. Moreover, no evidence of any correla-
tion between product price and safety was presented. See id. Even if Judge Rosenn's economic
rationale is conceded to be accurate, it still fails to reflect 1) the impracticability and prohibitive
cost of requiring the consumer to insure against the risk of injury by product defect, and 2) the
policy choice of placing the burden of insuring against such injury on those best able to bear it.
57. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text infra.
58. This is the result of applying the terms of a comparative negligence statute such as the
one in force in the Virgin Islands, which provides that "damages shall be diminished by the
trier of fact in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the plaintiff." See V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1451(a) (Equity Cum. Supp. 1978). For the text of the Virgin Islands
comparative negligence statute, see note 7 supra.
59. This result follows from the statutory language which provides that "[i]f [a] claimant is
found by the trier of fact to be more at fault than the defendant, . . . the claimant may not
recover." See V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1451(a) (Equity Cum. Supp. 1978). For the complete
text of the comparative negligence statute in force in the Virgin Islands, see note 7 supra.
60. For a discussion of these defenses in § 402A cases, see note 8 supra.
61. 610 F.2d at 162.
62. Whereas assumption of the risk and product misuse presently serve as an absolute bar to
recovery, application of comparative principles would enable plaintiffs to obtain judgments pre-
viously unavailable. The district court opinion in Murray indicated that assumption of the risk
would no longer be a complete bar to recovery when comparative principles are applied, but
would instead only diminish the plaintiff's recovery proportionately. See 450 F. Supp. at 1147
(dictum).
Some jurisdictions which have comparative negligence statutes have already applied com-
parative principles to these defenses. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725,
736-37, 575 P.2d 1162, 1169-70, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386-87 (1978) (negligent assumption of risk
merged with contributory negligence when comparative principles are applied in strict products
liability cases); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W,2d 344, 352 (Tex. 1977) ("pure"
comparative causation approach applied to product misuse case).
The Third Circuit has recently held that, in negligence cases, the "assumption of the risk"
defense applies only to non-negligent conduct constituting waiver or consent. See Keegan v.
Anchor Inns, Inc., 606 F.2d 35, 39 (3d Cir. 1979) (interpreting comparative negligence statute
of the Virgin Islands). Judge Rosenn has indicated, however, that such conduct, not amounting
1080
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ceived as a pro-manufacturer decision in its present posture, 63 it may, de-
spite its conceptual difficulties, 64 ultimately be viewed as a decision benefi-
cial to the consumer. 65
Clifford H. Lange
to waiver or consent, now constitutes contributory negligence within the scope of the Virgin
Islands comparative negligence statute. See 610 F.2d at 162 n. 15 (dictum). It remains to be seen
whether the Third Circuit is willing to take the next step and apply comparative negligence
principles uniformly to all types of plaintiffs' fault by treating assumption of risk on the same
footing as other causative factors attributable to the tort victim.
63. See notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra.
64. See notes 37-56 and accompanying text supra.
65. See notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra.
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